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Abstract: In this paper, we present a method for formal veriﬁcation of the
new Danish railway interlocking systems. We made a generic and reconﬁgurable
model of the behaviors and high-level safety properties of non-collision and non-
derailment. This model accommodates sequential release – a new feature in the
new Danish interlocking systems. Instantiating the generic model with interlocking
conﬁguration data results in a concrete model and high-level safety properties.
Using bounded model checking and inductive reasoning, we are able to verify safety
properties for model instances corresponding to railway networks of industrial size.
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Introduction. An interlocking system is responsible for guiding trains safely through a given
railway network. It is a vital part of any railway signaling system and has the highest safety
integrity level (SIL4) according to the CENELEC 50128 standard [CEN11]. Conventionally, the
development and veriﬁcation process of interlocking systems is informal and mostly manual,
hence time-consuming, costly, and error-prone. As part of the RobustRails research project1,
our work aims at establishing a holistic method supporting such a process. The method should
be formal and facilitate automation in order to provide a better development and veriﬁcation
process compared to the conventional one. In Denmark, in the period of 2009–2021, new
interlocking systems that are compatible with ETCS Level 2 [ERT12] will be deployed in the
entire country within the context of the Danish Signalling Programme2. In the context of the
RobustRail project accompanying the signalling programme on a scientiﬁc level, the proposed
method will be applied to these new systems.
Figure 1 shows the veriﬁcation process of our proposed method. The process begins with
the conﬁguration data [VHP14] in XML of an interlocking system consisting of: (i) a railway
network layout specifying the geographical information of the railway network, and (ii) an
interlocking table specifying how routes must be set so that trains can travel safely through
the network. This conﬁguration data is then used to instantiate our generic behavioral model of
the Danish interlocking systems, and its high-level safety properties of non-collision and non-
derailment. The behavioral model accommodates sequential release, a new feature that provides
the potential to increase the capacity of the network. For veriﬁcation and validation (V&V), we
follow the typical two-step approach. In the ﬁrst step, the data validation is performed on the
conﬁguration data to ensure the well-formedness of the model. In the second step, for a given
1 http://robustrails.man.dtu.dk
2 http://uk.bane.dk/visArtikel eng.asp?artikelID=6090
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conﬁguration data, the concrete high-level safety properties are veriﬁed for the concrete model
instance using bounded model checking (BMC) in combination with inductive reasoning. If the
model instance does not satisfy the properties, counter-examples will be generated. The method
has been implemented as a tool-chain for verifying interlocking systems using the RT-Tester
toolbox [Pel13] and its state-of-the-art SMT solver – SONOLAR.
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Figure 1: Veriﬁcation Process
Experiments. We have successfully used the tool-chain to verify the safety properties for
model instances of a number of railway networks, ranging from a trivial tiny toy network to
a large station (Køge) extracted from the early deployment line of the new Danish signalling
systems. The results demonstrate the advantages of the combined approach of BMC and
inductive reasoning for veriﬁcation of safety properties. First, it allows errors to be spotted
quickly. Our experiences with BMC show that the counter-examples, if there are any, are found
within a relatively short time of the model checking process. Second, the method can be scaled
up to the size of real applications in practice, hence facilitating the automated V&V process of
interlocking systems.
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